Peacekeeping in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) has descended into another bout of sectarian violence as Muslim fighters have had their arms seized and the minority comes under attack from the Christian majority.

This region of Africa is often forgotten as Sudan, The Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda dominate the news as violent clashes, war lords and child soldiers plague these states.

France has deployed to its old colony in an attempt to quell the violence and though some have argued that it is another attempt to serve their own interests they have been well received. CAR has 4.6 million people and only 200 police officers, that is 1 policemen to every 23,000 people. No wonder they cannot control the populace.

French troops patrol limited areas of the CAR

Michel Djotodia came to power on the back of a rebellion last year after the Muslim Seleka ousted Francois Bozize on the charge of failing to respect a peace deal agreed in 2007. Yet, the rebels have continued to attack the populace leading to the rise of sectarian violence as Christian ‘anti-balaka’ work to protect themselves. Making matters worse is that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is operating in this region. In addition, it is not a good moment to be an elephant as over 90% have been killed for exports of ivory to the developed world in order to finance the conflict.

However, what affect have the French forces had upon the violence in this region? Though widely well received is that because they have supported the majority Christians as suggested by the Muslims?

In the CAR French peacekeepers have, with the permission of the UN, begun to remove weapons from the Muslim fighters but this has allowed militias to launch reprisals. Christians were angry at the government, blaming their economic conditions on its policies but in reality it reflected the current global pattern and the UN’s inability to access the region as it feared armed groups.

Disarming the Muslim groups draws the state into a stalemate and as suggested third party interventions appear to prolong conflict. They place a barrier between the fighters and enable them to build up rhetoric and weapons. If peacekeepers are implemented for a long period which enables the sides to ‘forget’ the atrocities which occurred or economically divert their attention then this may be effective. Yet, with no form of statehood it looks likely to be a costly and protracted peacekeeping mission.

Many desperately flee the conflict via any form of transport.

Nonetheless, the haunting memory of Rwanda keeps Western politicians eager to implement forces to prevent the feared genocide in the CAR. But are they doing enough?

In the Defence Web’s analysis of peacekeeping it notes that Retired Rear Admiral Rolf Hauter argues the mandate for an operation must correspond with the requirement on the ground to have any chance of success, “the forces assigned to the operation must be able and willing to execute the mandate ie adequate numbers, trained and correctly equipped. If not, it will most probably be a waste of time”.

The forces committed to conflict resolution must be significant enough to reach to all corners of the state. Presently, French forces are unable to police the rural areas where the militants have set up new bases and continue the atrocities.

In light of the British Army’s Strategic Narrative published on the 1^st October 2013 it is clear that for a military force to achieve successful intervention a division strength of 25,000 troops is necessary. In fact, this is mentioned consistently in the report. Simply, we need to concentrate on several issues at a time and devote considerable resources to conflict resolution, whether economic or militarily. Cutting the Armed forces in the United Kingdom is the appropriate course of action as the United Kingdom is accused by Robert Gates, former US defence secretary, as being unable to fulfil its full partnership alongside the United States.

If we are committed to resolving conflict in the international context we must retain a strong military force which we are prepared to deploy for long periods of time in effective peacekeeping missions. With the Taliban suggesting Afghanistan will be retaken after the troops pull out in 2014 we need to revise our peacekeeping strategy and halt risky and small operations which serve only to reduce conflict in the short-term. Long-term policies may not be popular with the voter but the public must stop and consider the arguments.