NATO and Tribal Elements in Afghanistan

For the media to portray Afghanistan in a manner easily understood by a wider audience they must inevitably reduce the complexities of the local and tribal relations to broad locations and groupings. For instance, stating that the Pashtuns largely occupy the south of Afghanistan and the north of Pakistan; whilst the Haraza, Aimak, Uzbek, Tajik, and Uzbek occupy the North. This is overly simplistic as shown by this map:

Note the pockets of Pashtun throughout the North (The light green colour if it is hard to see)

(The Pashtun pockets originate from the rule of Amir Abdur Rahman who uprooted many tribal communities with the goal of strengthening the central government and deliberately weakening the tribal system. He was a Pashtun himself but he resettled various Pashtun tribes and subtribes as punishment for rebellion or to use them as counterweights against hostile non-Pashtun tribes or ethnic groups.)

On the one hand, rather than analysing local tribal factors, it is this broad understanding that NATO and Afghan government forces have based their counter-insurgency policy upon. The work of Robert Gonzalez reiterates this understanding as he contends that a misguided focus on the ‘tribal’ features of Afghanistan is drawn from the ‘desperate political situation’ to identify a source of insurgency that may be rapidly resolved – tribes are ‘imagined’ collections of individuals.

Yet, this argument fails to appreciate the patrilineal segmentary lineage systems that operate in these regions for the ‘social structure of communities is based either on the tribe or the locality’ which unites together if faced by an external threat.

On the other hand, the Taliban use their pre-existing knowledge of tribes, subtribes, and clans to convince the tribes to co-opt and recruit local leaders who can convince their men to fight. The Afghan government has only served to deepen and strengthen this tactic through mismanagement, patronage, and corruption of local strongman not necessarily linked to the quam, a unit of identification and solidarity that could be based on kinship, residence, or occupation.

This is combined with an image of the U.S. and NATO that is at its lowest point since 2001 making the mobilisation of tribes on their side more unlikely.

Ergo, the US and NATO considered the Pashtun as a whole and failed to comprehend the vast web of tribes allowing the Taliban insurgency to rise within the population.

12 Years On and What Have We Achieved in Afghanistan?

With the departure of troops from Afghanistan intended for 2014 and David Cameron’s recent trip to Camp Bastion to declare, or rather infer, ‘mission accomplished’ it seems Afghanistan is finally over.

Yet, the media was quick to draw parallels between G. W. Bush’s speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on Iraq in 2003 due to their disbelief that coalition forces have managed to secure any of their objectives. They were not far off the truth.

Soldiers appear bemused?

The objectives were to:

Disable Al Qaeda

Yes, Mr. Cameron you have the right to fist bump the air as Coalition forces did disable Al Qaeda within their area of operations. However, Al Qaeda typifies a new form of actor on the international stage, one that does not have a set piece of land. Therefore, capturing a certain town or a capital will not destroy it as it is the ideology and the people which embody the organisation. To destroy this it will take localised actors, a shift in ideology or a reconciliation process. None seem likely.

Disable the Taliban

Driving the Taliban from Afghanistan is difficult. The Taliban, like Al Qaeda, are now partially removed from a certain spatial space. Yes, you can predominately find them in the south of Afghanistan but that is simply because they are predominately Pashtun and gain support from Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan presents another issue as the Pashtun constitute the majority within the northern regions. This makes it easier for Taliban fighters to cross the border but coalition troops cannot as it violates the independent statehood of Pakistan. Finally, the villagers are reluctant to inform on the Taliban as they fear reprisals as Coalition forces wind down their processes.The Taliban’s Qatar office which was seen as an embassy for a government in waiting accentuates the point. Likewise, when Coalition forces arm villager defense forces against the Taliban they often end up being shot by the same weapons they gave out the week before.

The belief that the Taliban are slowing their attacks or waiting till Coalition forces pull out is unfounded. We just are not hearing about the attacks because it is the Afghan National Army that are taking the brunt of the fighting.

This article by the BBC talks in-depth about village defense forces and the arguments for and against them.

Militias have had little success. Credit: BBC

Additionally, more Taliban attacks have started to occur in the Western and Northern areas of Afghanistan which are typically seen as safe areas for the Karzai government. It is likely that the Taliban are trying to suggest that Karzai has a lack of control over the whole state. He personally agrees, stating that:

“The entire NATO exercise was one that caused Afghanistan a lot of suffering, a lot of loss of life, and no gains because the country is not secure.”

There goes the whole ‘mission accomplished’ rhetoric… put your fist down Mr. Cameron.

(Important to note that when I refer to the Pashtun I am not stating they are all Taliban but that the Taliban are mainly of Pashtun or external origin).

Drug Prevention

This seemed to be an objective at the beginning of the campaign however it has declined as this year saw a bumper crop of poppies in Afghanistan. 6000 tons, the biggest since the invasion began, was harvested.

Conversely, Afghanistan’s 2000 drug eradiction program under the Taliban was highly effective with production falling to 185 tons in 2001 compared to 3300 tons in 2000.  It was even acknowledged at the October 2001 session of the UN General Assembly though since the war started the Coalition has been keen to distance itself from this.

Yet, the reduction in opium did have detrimental outcomes for the farmers as they struggled to feed their families. Wheat needs more water and earns no money until it is sold. The opium trade gave the money up front.

See this article for more information.

Create a stable and loyal Afghan National Army (ANA)

Yes, no, maybe?

Well some ethnic and political faction leaders have begun to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power. Successful? Erm, no?

This was illustrated in a November 2012 meeting organized by Herat leader Ismail Khan, in which he reportedly began taking steps to reorganize his Soviet and Taliban-era militia. Vice President Muhammad Fahim has also discussed potentially renewing the Northern Alliance force in anticipation of the need to assist Afghan government forces against the Taliban. And Uzbek leader Dostam is also reportedly trying to reorganize his loyalists in northern Afghanistan. These and similar moves could spark ethnic and communal conflict from an all-out struggle for power and a reversion to Afghan rule by faction leaders rather than elected leaders.

US forces training the Afghan National Army.

Do armies even work in a clan based societies?

Armies need to be centred on a shared common identity and a goal. At present the ANA comprises of Afghans from the North with the goal of fighting the Taliban south. The title is misleading as it is not a national force, rather what resembles the Northern Alliance with a few new toys courtesy of the coalition.

For a rather stimulating and patriotic history of the Taliban and what the Americans have done about it read this:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

So moving on to 2014 about 8,000 to 12,000 American trainers and Special Forces will remain in Afghanistan alongside with 5,000 coalition forces. Clearly some way to go and that means that not all forces are pulling out. It is one of those "we said we would pull all the troops out but then..."

In the realm of international politics that is sort of understandable.

Provide proficient Aid

This article would not fit in to my blog if I did not discuss aid. But, it is kind of the same story again - I'm really noticing a trend.

The aid is going through the governments of Kabul and thus the people are being told what they need!

Only in 2008 did the UK gov ask the people what they wanted and were truly shocked by the answer that came back.

Basically, as per, see this Ben Anderson documentary on Afghanistan. There is also a more recent one entitled 'This Is What Winning Looks Like'.

And if you prefer to listen to all the arguments surrounding Afghanistan listen to reliable Ben talking to VICE. Good discussion on women rights and the views of a typical Afghan villager.

Thoughts welcome as always.